Epilogue and prologue

What has 2011 meant for the Arab world?

As an epilogue to these series of texts on the third Arab revolution which started in 2011 (after the first one in 1916 and the second one in the 50s), it can be said that 2011 has implied for the Arab world:

- the beginning of the end (only the beginning yet) of the Arab exception, according to which the Arab world was ruled by dictators, but vested interests forced us to turn a blind eye on this fact. Only one country, Tunisia, has managed a peaceful transition nearly free from outside interferences. In the others, all sort of interferences have been the rule.

- the beginning of a process whereby the Arab youth sides with democracy, the rule of law and fundamental freedoms, including equality between men and women, specially in countries like Tunisia or Egypt.

- the exposure to light of internal incoherencies: (1) the existence of absolute monarchies, whose peoples ask for reform and for an evolution towards a model of parliamentary monarchies, with popular demonstrations which are violently repressed, and with Saudi Arabia as the main champion of resistance to change, but as they are monarchies  we still turn a blind eye; (2) the renewed explosion of the thousand year old dilemma between Sunnism and Shi’ism, with Saudi Arabia leading the historical animosity against Iranian Shi’ism, exacerbated since the autumn of 2011 by the decision of different international actors (USA, UK, Canada and Israel) to corner Iran even more, if possible; and (3) an Israel that continues to accelerate the building of illegal settlements in occupied Palestinian land, with utter impunity, and without any interest in or prospects of peace negotiations progressing.

What can the future bring to the Arab world?

The prologue of what will come will depend mainly on how the dichotomy between resistance to change vs democratization is resolved, subject in turn to human-political imponderables both regional and international and to powerful vested interests:

-  the main hurdle in the years to come is to continue allowing and supporting Arab monarchies that are dictatorships that, on the one hand, hinder democratic reforms inside their countries and, on the other hand, channel resources towards the most reactionary forces in the other Arab countries in state of ferment.

- the other great hurdle is to continue allowing Israel to act with total impunity against international law.

Possible scenarios:

- the worst: the beginning of a war against Iran, given the coincidence of anti-Iranian interest both in Saudi Arabia (to eliminate the Shi’ia enemy) and Israel (to eliminate the only regional actor that has the willingness and capability of opposing Israeli plans to colonize all Palestinian occupied territories to render a two state solution non-viable). It would be a similar alliance to the one between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and USA to take the power away from pro-Soviet Governments in Afghanistan in the 80s; or the coalition of the willing to remove Sadam Hussein in Iraq in 2003 [the excuse then: weapons of mass destruction, that Iraq never had; the excuse now: nuclear weapons that Iran doesn’t have].

- the best: that Saudi Arabia understands that it can’t remain eternally an island of iron dictatorship and democratises internally, and that it becomes aware of the important and positive regional role it can play in the Arab world, similar to the one Saudi King Faisal played in 1974 in support of the Palestinian cause; and that Israel, forced by a change in regional attitudes, understands that in the long term it is in its benefit to sign peace with Palestine, and sings it.